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Book Reviews
LAW AND THE CONDITION OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CEN-

by James Willard Hurst. Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. 139 pp.
TURY UNITED STATES,

Professor Willard Hurst has written one of the most stimulating books that this reviewer has run across in some time. He
has made a careful and scholarly survey of the nineteenth century from a unique point of view and come up with some most
interesting, indeed remarkable, conclusions. Certainly the book
deserves the attention of lawyers who are concerned with the
perennial problem of the relationship between law and society,
and politicians who are sometimes given to unfounded generalizations about the "good old days," as well as historians who are
interested in the past as such.
The purpose of this book is, as Professor Hurst puts it, to
seek "to understand the law not so much as it may appear to
philosophers, but more as it had meaning for workaday people
and was shaped by them to their wants and visions." (p. 5) And
in order to so understand the law he looks to the actual uses to
which it was put rather than to the ways in which nineteenth
century philosophers or historians said it was used. For, as he
says, "one usually senses that he is closer to apprehending the
decisive faiths and beliefs of our nineteenth century ancestors
when he reads these out of what they did and said as they acted,
rather than out of their self-conscious philosophizing." (p. 5)
The conclusions he reaches are startlingly different from the
traditional laissez faire picture of the period in which the law
"played a minimum positive role in shaping nineteenth century
society." (p. 7) In fact he finds that the law was used to an
extent that would undoubtedly still alarm many present-day
conservatives, for, he concludes:
"Relative to the great simplicity of structure in the Wisconsin community of 1836-1870, for example, there was hardly less readiness to use the positive power of the state than
one sees in 1905-1915 as we usher in the twentieth century
of administrative regulations." (p. 7-8)
[5601
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The point is, of course, that the LaFollettes, John R. Commons,
E. A. Ross, and Richard T. Ely flourished during the latter
period.
Professor Hurst begins with three "base lines of nineteenth
century public policy" which determined the attitude of the
"workaday" people towards the law: (i) "human nature is creative, and its meaning lies largely in the expression of its creative capacity"; (ii) "the meaning of life for men rests in their
possession of a wide practical range of options or choices as to
what they do and how they are affected by circumstances"; and
(iii) these propositions are of special significance in the United
States where "unclaimed natural abundance together with the
promise of new technical command of nature dictate that men
should realize their creative energy and exercise their liberty
peculiarly in the realm of the economy to the enhancement of
other human values." (p. 5-6)
Inherent in these tenets, he finds two "working principles
concerning the uses of the law" (p. 6) : first, it should be used
to maximize the "release of creative energy" of the individual which meant not only avoiding all unnecessary interferences
with him, but also providing him with "instruments and procedures to lend support of the organized community to the affecting of man's creative talents, even where this involved using
the law's compulsion to enforce individual arrangements" (p. 6) ;
and, secondly, it should be used so as to "mobilize the resources
of the community to help shape an environment which would
give men more liberty by increasing the practical range of
choices open to them and minimizing the limiting forces of circumstances." (p. 6) Both of these principles clearly contemplate
positive uses of the law.
This book consists largely of a study of the numerous applications of these "working principles" by nineteenth century society. Appropriately, therefore, the first two (of three) chapters are entitled "The Release of Energy" and "Control of Environment" respectively. The third is called "The Balance of
Power" for it deals with the period after 1870, when the deep
changes in American life made the "base line" assumptions, with
their optimistic confidence in the individual, somewhat tenuous.
And Professor Hurst shows how, as a result, the "working principles" were reshaped during that period to meet the particular
"challenge" then facing society: economic power amassed in the
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hands of private individuals. The solution, or "response," was,
in accordance with Calhoun's principle of meeting "power with
power and tendency with tendency," to reestablish a "balance of
power" through collective (private and public) action.
The value of such a study is enormous. By cutting through
misleading verbiage and analyzing the actual uses to which the
law was put, Professor Hurst has given us a known factor in
the nineteenth century equation. He has, one feels, provided us
with the means to a deeper understanding of the period than was
possessed by the actors themselves; for we are in the splendid
position of being able to compare what they said with what they
did. And every nineteenth century statement made relating to
the law should be compared with and evaluated in the light of
Professor Hurst's record of actual performance.
But a study based on "principles defined and expressed primarily by action," however admirable, has inherent limitations.
Professor Hurst recognizes this himself when he says:
"Of course, this is not the only viewpoint from which to appraise the legal system ....

We are simply trying one angle

of vision provided by history for the distinctive reality it may
disclose." (p. 5)
Notwithstanding this disclaimer, however, Professor Hurst
has not always recognized the limitations to this approach; and
as a consequence he has assumed one conclusion that is neither
justified by his premises nor conclusively established by his facts.
And that conclusion is of such importance that it sets the tone
for the whole book. It is that laissez faire was a myth in the
nineteenth century.
In order to explode the myth of laissez faire it is obviously
necessary to understand the meaning of the term. Professor
Hurst (like many others who have attacked this "myth"') has
not bothered to define it; but he has described it as a society in
which people "got along well enough if the legislature provided
schools, the sheriff ran down horse thieves, the court tried farmers' title disputes, and otherwise the law left men to take care of
1. See, for example,

HARTZ,

ECONOMIC POLICY AND

DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT:

PENNSYLVANIA 1776-1860 (1948) and 0. AND M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH
MASSACHUSSETS, 1774-1861 (1947), two studies that have decisively influenced

contemporary versions of the role of the law in the nineteenth century. For some
of the possible ramifications of these books see Stone, The Myth of Planning and
Laissez Faire: A Reorientation, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1948).
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themselves." (p. 7) Accordingly, his case against laissez faire
consists of a detailed account of the numerous ways in which the
law was used; and as such uses are far more common than his
word-picture implies, he concludes that it was a myth.
No one, certainly not I, will deny that he has amply proved
his case. But one can wonder if the "laissez faire" he has routed
is that which was advocated during the nineteenth century.
There is, I think, at least one compelling reason for suspecting
that it is not. That is, some of the most influential and dogmatic
champions of laissez faire sanctioned many (if not all) of the
uses of the law to which Professor Hurst has referred.
A large and influential contingency of nineteenth century
writers advocated "hands off" only as a general rule and not as
a literal absolute.2 Yet they were still zealous advocates of
laissez faire. Take for example John Stuart Mill, whom T. V.
Smith has obligingly called the "spokesman of laissez faire."
Though an Englishman, he may perhaps speak for Americans of
this faith for an edition of his Principles of Political Economy
was published in this country within a year of its original publication in 1848; and, as Joseph Dorfman has noted, "as an upto-date edition of Wealth of Nations it became the standard
'3
authority.
2. This group would include, according to Schumpeter, most political economists. As he puts it (in a suggestive passage) : "Practically all economists believedno matter what they desired-that,as J. S. Mill put it, laissez faire was

the general rule for the administration of a nation's economic affairs and that
what was significantly called state 'interference' was the exception. And, though
for different reasons in different countries, this was so in actual practice not only
as a matter of fact but also as a matter of practical necessity; no responsible
administrator could have held then, and no responsible historian should hold now,
that, social and economic conditions and the organs of public administration being
what they were, any ambitious ventures in regulation and control could have issued
in anything but failure." SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 548
(1954).
Certainly it would include most of the English classical political economists.
See, for example,

MALTHUS,

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

14-16

(2d ed.

1836) ; MCCULLOCH, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 262-309 (4th ed. 1849) ;
CAIRNES, ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY-

THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL 232-264

(1873).
For an example of a legal scholar (as well as political economist) who advocated this precise brand of laissez faire, see LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF
GOVERNMENT 207 (1859).
On the practical side there is reason to believe that Alexander Hamilton should
be included among them; for it has been said that he based his celebrated Report
on Manufacturers on The Wealth of Nations. Bourne detected twenty close simi-

larities, both in ideas and expressions, that would seem to suggest that Hamilton
tracked Smith's argument, diverging only where he felt exceptions were warranted because of difference of circumstances. Bourne, Alexander Hamilton and
Adam Smith, 8 Q.J. ECONOMICS 328 (1894).
3. 2 THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 710 (1946).
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Mill declared his colors in a well-known passage: "Laissez
faire, in short, should be the general practice: every departure
from it, unless required by some great good, is a certain evil."'

But this did not mean that he advocated a one-horse sort of society as described by Professor Hurst. Indeed he sanctioned
many uses of the law that, according to Professor Hurst, were
not taken up in America. 5 As Mill wrote in a passage all too
often overlooked today:

"When those who have been called the laissez faire school
have attempted any definite limitation of the province of government, they have merely restricted it to the protection of
person and property against force and fraud; a definition to
which they nor anyone else can deliberately adhere, since it
excludes, as has been shown in a preceding chapter, some of
the most indispensable, and unanimously recognized, of the
duties of government." 6
And in the "preceding chapter" Mill made a basic distinction
between the necessary and the optional functions of government,
the former being those "which are inseparable from the idea of
4. 5 MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY c. xi, § 7 (1865).

5. A striking example of Mill recognizing an "exception" to his general rule
of laissez faire that was not accepted in this country until much later involved
the regulation of railroads, canals, and other public utilities. Mill regards these
industries as being inherently monopolistic and he says "a government which
concedes such monopoly unreservedly to a private company, does much the same
thing as if it allowed an individual or an association to levy any tax they chose,
for their own benefit, on all the malt produced in the country, or on all the coffee
imported to it." Id. § 11.
Professor Hurst, describing the nineteenth century use of the law with respect
to railroads and canals, refers to a "broad pattern of mid-nineteenth century public
policy by which legislation delegated public function, to private groups." (p. 65)
These "delegated" public functions included the right to fix tolls; and he admits
that "in the absence of any effective administrative provision to enforce the
statutory standards [of reasonableness of rates], the delegated toll powers left a
large discretion to the grantees to exact from their customers contributions to the
capital of the enterprise." (pp. 63-64) "In practical effect," he concludes, the government "delegated a taxing power to private decision makers to help mobilize
their capital." (p. 63) And therefore it follows that laissez faire was a myth!
In the light of these two quotations it seems almost incredible that Mill should
be advocating laissez faire and Professor Hurst proving it a myth. Yet that is
exactly what they are doing. It certainly seems that Professor Hurst has ignored
the truth that Henry Carter Adams observed in 1883: "The importance [he wrote]
of government, or the extent of the function assigned to it, is not measured by the
amount of legislation which its law-making bodies turn off from year to year, but
rather by the nature of the administrative duties imposed upon it, or by the extent
of the power assigned to its courts .... It is especially the administrative functions
of government that the doctrine of laissez faire attacks." RELATION OF THE STATE
TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN ECONOMICS OR JURISPRUDENCE: Two ESSAYS BY HENRY

CARTER ADAMS 116-17 (Dorfman, ed., 1883).
6. 5 MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, c. xi, § 2 (1865).
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a government, or are exercised habitually and without objection
'7
by all governments.

Now Mill's point is this: the "laissez faire school" did not, or
did not mean to, condemn the "necessary" function of government. It sought only to curtail "optional" functions - those "on
which diversity of opinion does or may exist." And even as re-

gards these latter functions Mill advocated, or recommended,
certain exceptions in which the government was "justified" in
"interfering." In short, Mill's particular brand of laissez faire
condemned only "unjustifiable interferences.

'8

Thus to explode

it as a myth one must show that during the nineteenth century
the law was used for "unjustifiable interferences"; and conversely it cannot be exploded by showing that the law was used
for "necessary function" or "justifiable interferences," both of
which were recognized "exceptions."

-Has Professor Hurst done this? His sweeping language certainly indicates that he has. Thus in one of the most remarkable
passages in the book he says "the nineteenth century was prepared to treat law casually as an instrument to be used wherever
it looked as if it would be useful" (p. 10) ; and, again, "where
legal regulation and compulsion might promote the greater release of individual or group creative energies we had no hesitancy in making affirmative use of the law." (p. 7) But he has
not actually considered the possibility that the uses of the law to

which he has referred were "exceptions" to a general rule of
7. Id. c. i, § 1.
8. The word "interference," or some obvious synonym, was constantly used by
ninteenth century writers. For example, Francis Bowen (the Harvard professor
who said laissez faire meant "of course that God regulates things by his General
Laws") held that "the ruler or governor who is most to be dreaded is, not the
tyrant, but the busybody." THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 23 (2d ed.
1859). And Judge Thomas Cooley, the author of the well-known treatise on
Constitutional Limitations, severely criticized the Supreme Court decision in
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (which upheld state regulation of public
utilities "affected with a public interest") on the grounds that the State should
not "impede" or "interpose impediments." PRINCETON REVIEW (March 1878),
quoted in TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME
TO THE SUPREME COURT 37 (1942). These terms are of course loaded. They
imply that the authors are referring to those laws that in fact "interfere" or
"meddle" or "impede"; and they also suggest that the authors have overlooked or
taken for granted a whole host of laws that are not so offensive. In other words,
many nineteenth century authors may have unconsciously condemned government
in general (including beneficial laws) because of contempt for certain "interfering"
laws. As noted in the text, Mill was conscious of this tendency in his fellow
members of the "laissez faire school"; and he reminded them of the numerous
benefical laws they had overlooked. Professor Hurst has fulfilled the same function today. The only difference is that Mill considered these other laws compatible
with, while Professor Hurst holds them incompatible with, laissez faire.
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laissez faire. Nor could he, logically; for his study, which is
based on "principles defined and expressed primarily by action,"
(p. 5) excludes all evidence of non-action (laissez faire).9
In fact the great bulk of uses of the law described by Professor Hurst are specifically sanctioned by Mill as either "necessary functions" or "justifiable interferences" ;o and as such they
9. It should be noted that Professor Hurst gives a very interesting account of
how the notion of laisesz faire came to be applied to the nineteenth century in
the first place; for, as he says, "there is likely to be some basis in experience for
every myth." (p. 8) He attributes it to two factors: the unquestioned devotion
of nineteenth century society to "property"; and to the "frontier" which obscured
the true role of law.
As to the former, Professor Hurst says that we unconsciously associate "property" with the seventeenth century English institution which so stoutly resisted
the Crown; and by analogy we have assumed that since nineteenth century
Americans were devoted to property that they harbored the same negative ideas
about law and government. But, he points out, this was not so for "property"
was, in the nineteenth century, "preeminently a dynamic, not a static institution."
(p. 8) As a result, our energies were devoted not to protecting the status quo,
but to producing and acquiring new property. And this required and demanded
positive law.
Now I do not deny this. In fact, I think it is one of the most significant
points in the book. But what does it prove? That the nineteenth century did
not adopt the seventeenth century English attitude towards the law; and that
the law was used positively. It tells us absolutely nothing, however, about the
nature of that use-whether it was used "compulsively" or "permissively," to
promote the rankest individualism or to increase social responsibility.
10. The remarkable similarity between Professor Hurst's proof that laissez
faire is a myth and Mill's list of "necessary function" of government (bk. v, c. i),
is indicated by the following comparison: the decision to reject feudal restraints
on the alienation of land to which Professor Hurst refers (pp. 12-13) is regarded
by Mill to be a determination of the laws of inheritance-a necessary and inescapable function of government; the allocation of natural resources so as to
"shape the environment" (chapter ii generally), and the formulation of public
land policy so as to promote commercial agriculture (p. 55) and to direct the
flow "of domestic investment" (p. 61) which loom so important to Professor
Hurst, are but the consequences of the government exercising its necessary powersnone of which, according to Mill, are "less optional" - over our "common inheritance" of natural resources; by relying upon the doctrine of consideration
and refusing to uphold contracts against public policy (pp. 11-12), as well as by
forbidding states and municipalities to repudiate their public debts (p. 62), the
courts were simply deciding which contracts the government would enforce, as
well as providing tribunals for civil disputes- functions which Mill regarded as
quite necessary in any civilized society.
There are others as well. But one more sample will suffice to show how
radically different Professor Hurst and Mill construe the same use of law. As if administering a lethal blow to laissez faire Professor Hurst says: "nineteenth century
policy did not confine the spending of public relief to maintaining police functions.
The rational government used its revenues from taxes as well as from public
lands to build lighthouses and improve harbours, particularly at first in aid of
coastal navigation." (p. 61) Mill, however, calmly acknowledges all these governmental activities as "necessary functions" which do not even intrude "upon disputed ground." In fact he says "making and improving harbours, building lighthouses, making surveys in order to have accurate maps and charts, raising dykes
to keep the sea out, and embankments to keep rivers in, are cases" in which the
government has acted and "no one, however, even of those most jealous of state
interference, has objected to [such action] as an improper exercise of the power
of government."
Mill also listed eight "exceptional" cases in which governmental interference
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could hardly be proof that Mill's general rule was a myth. Indeed one could say - and, I take it, Mill and his followers would
hasten to do so - that Professor Hurst is guilty of considering
"exceptions" out of context, thereby appearing to explode a general rule he has really proved. For when all is said and done
Mill still preached, despite his "exceptions," something he called,
and others understood to be, "laissez faire." 1'
But Mill was admittedly one of the more open-minded champions of laissez faire; and it may be said that his views are not
representative of the more dogmatic members of that "school."
Thus it should be useful to consider the attitudes of Herbert
Spencer and Francis Wayland towards certain uses of law that
Professor Hurst has relied upon to prove that laissez faire was
a myth.
Professor Hurst gives a good deal of attention to the phenomenal growth of contract law which he calls "the outstanding area
of common law development in the first half of the century" (p.
13) ; and he concludes that this development "invoked the compulsive force of the State to set a framework for dealing, to an
extent which must materially qualify appraisal of the laissez
faire element of our policy." (p. 15) Yet Herbert Spencer perhaps the most extreme of the champions of laissez faire divided social organizations into two types, the "Regime of
Status" (based on "compulsory" cooperation) and the "Regime
of Contracts" (based on "voluntary" cooperation) .12 And to him
the problem was not whether the law should be used or not used,
but whether it should be used compulsively, at the initiative of
was justified. For a reference to one of these see note 5 supra. The point that
I am trying to make here is that despite all these recognized uses of the law Mill
still advocated laissez faire. If, therefore, Professor Hurst has shown that the law
was so used, Mill has shown that they did not effect his brand of laissez faire.
The question, therefore, is not whether law was or was not used; but whether it
was used in accordance with Mill's stipulations -only
for "necessary functions"
and "justifiable interferences." It remains unanswered.
11. Lest one think Mill's "exceptions" demolished his "general rule," consider
the following appraisal of them by Henry Carter Adams, who attacked laissez
faire in the 'eighties. "The concessions granted by Mr. Mill . . . amount to little
when we notice how strictly he guards his exceptions to the rule that the state
should not interfere with industrial action." RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION IN ECONOMICS OR JURISPRUDENCE: Two ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER

ADAMS 75 (Dorfman, ed., 1954). Cf. note 5 supra.
12. THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE 1 (1884). Hofstadter notes, incidentally,
that by 1903, 368,755 volumes of Spencer's works had been sold in the United
States. SoCIAL DARWINIsM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 34. Sir Henry Maine put
contract law in its proper perspective vis-a-vis laissez faire when he observed that
it was the "bulwark of American individualism against democratic impulse and
socialistic fantasy."

POPULAR GOVERNMENT 248 (1885).
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the State, or voluntarily, at the initiative of the individual.
Thus one can easily imagine that he would have been genuinely
puzzled by Professor Hurst's use of the term "compulsive force"
in connection with contracts. Certainly one could argue that the
development referred to by Professor Hurst was evidence that
voluntary cooperation
which was, to Spencer, tantamount to
laissez faire- was increasing, not decreasing, in influence.
Another nineteenth century phenomenon that Professor
Hurst refers to in his attack against laissez faire is the development of the corporation which he calls "the most potent single
instrument which the law put at the disposal of private decision
makers." (p. 15) He notes that "the East India Company as the
type of the corporation - a rare thing, an unusual grant of special privilege in law for purposes of high policy" (p. 15), was
rejected; and, he adds, "it was characteristic of the nineteenth
century that there was here also a demand for positive help from
the law" for, in the place of the rejected special charter corporations, was substituted general corporation statutes, making "the
privilege of incorporation for ordinary business purposes . . .
available to all on equal terms." (p.. 17) Now, this is an important development - one well worth bringing to our attention.
But is it evidence that laissez faire was a myth? Let us compare
these developments with the teachings of Francis Wayland, one
whose devotion to laissez faire would hardly be questioned and
whose Elements of Political Economy was the standard American text-book for some forty years following its publication in
1837. Among the "forms of legislative interferences" that he
objects to (on the solid laissez faire grounds that they prevent
the individual from making use of his capital and labour as he
sees fit) is the monopoly form of corporation; and to show the
consequent evils of such a practice he, like Professor Hurst, explains that "such was the exclusive right granted to the East
India Company."' 13 Thus Wayland would hardly have objected to
the decision to reject the monopoly-type corporation. Nor would
he have objected to the use of the law to make the privilege of
incorporation freely available. As he wrote:
... when individuals wish to be associated for any innocent
purpose, they may claim an act of incorporation as a right;
and it is necessary for the protection of the community that
13. THE ELEMENTS OF POLTIcAL ECONOMY 69 (1878).

BOOK REVIEWS

1959]

it should be granted. And hence, from both of these consid14
erations, it is incumbent upon a legislature to grant it.'

Wayland would hardly agree, however, that this privilege gave
the State any special power over, or the right to regulate, the
affairs of corporations. Indeed he goes to great pain to point out
that "the act of incorporation 'like all legislation'- never confers any right whatever; it only confirms those rights which previously existed." Hence, to the suggestion that corporations are
creatures of the legislature subject to legislative control, he indignantly retorts:
"This is surely a novel doctrine to advance in the audience
of a free people; and whenever it is advanced the time has
manifestly arrived for a people which intends to continue
free, to turn their attention to the consideration of first principles."' 15
It is hard for me to see how this use of the law Professor Hurst
has cited differs from that sanctioned by Wayland; and it is
even harder for me to see how it proves Wayland's brand of
laissez faire to have been a myth.
Thus we see that these acknowledged champions of laissez
faire -

Mill, Spencer, and Wayland -

sanctioned most (if not

all) of the uses of the law that Professor Hurst has relied upon
to prove that laissez faire was a myth. This must mean one of
two things: either these uses of the law were not inconsistent
with laissez faire - in which case Professor Hurst has been
wrestling with a strawman; or these nineteenth century writers
did not advocate laissez faire - a conclusion I find hard to swallow in the face of their express statements to the contrary. To
me the former seems most likely.
This conclusion is confirmed by considering, from a slightly
different point of view, Professor Hurst's two positive "working
principles concerning the use of the law." Suppose, rather than
saying (as he does) that the law was used positively to "release
the creative energy" of individuals we said that it was only made
available to those who were willing to help themselves. Again,
suppose, rather than saying that the law was also used positively
to "increase the practical range of choices open to individuals"
and to "minimize the limiting force of circumstances," we said
14. Id. at 177.
15. Id. at 178.
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that the only other way in which the law was used to assist individuals was by controlling their environment so as to make it
easier for them to help themselves. We could then deduce from
these two "working principles" a third one: though the law was

used positively in the nineteenth century it was not used "directly" (or, to use Spencer's term again, "compulsively") to assist
individuals; the most it did was to assist them "indirectly" by
helping them to help themselves and by making their surroundings more conducive to such self-help.
Now Professor Hurst is justified in saying that this consti-

tutes proof that his brand of laissez faire was a myth for, as he
put it, if "enlargement of men's freedom was the objective, it
was, indeed, freedom under the law." (p. 32) But he thereby

creates the impression that all nineteenth century writers advocated a different sort of freedom, or literally anarchy

-an

im-

pression that I think unfair and unwarranted. In the first place
(as I have pointed out above) he has logically excluded all evi-

dence of "non-action"

-

such as books advocating laissez faire -

by limiting his study to "principles defined and expressed primarily by action." Secondly he has assumed, after excluding

such evidence, that nineteenth century authors were mere "self
conscious philosophizers" who were so out of touch with their

times that they cannot be trusted to reflect "the decisive faiths
and beliefs of our nineteenth century ancestors" (p. 5). Then,
after clearing away the dead wood, he reveals the truth; and (as
Bentham said of a friend that let him down) : "Lo, the Mountain

has delivered itself of a mouse." For Professor Hurst's description of the uses of the law comport almost exactly with the recommendations of the Classical Political Economists !"' And if he
16. Selections from works by two Classical Political Economists may serve to
show the similarity between the teachings of these advocates of laissez faire and
Professor Hurst's positive "working principles concerning the use of the law."
J. R. McCulloch, the gentleman who is generally given credit (if that is the word)
for inventing the phrase "Wage Fund," wrote: "The function of government is
not only to protect property; it is also bound to give every due facility to individuals about to engage in such useful undertakings as cannot be carried on
without its sanction; and it should not only endeavour to protect its peaceable
and industrious subjects from the machinations of the idle and profligate, but also
against the accident arising from the operation of natural causes to which their
persons and properties may otherwise be exposed." THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 265 (4th ed. 1849). This statement seems to me to be a restatementor, I should say, pre-statement - of Professor Hurst's two working principles of
using the law to "release creative energy" and to "control the environment" so as
to enlarge opportunities.
The only real difference between them is, I take it, that McCulloch adds- "It
cannot, however, be too strongly impressed upon those in authority, that non-
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has proved laissez faire a myth, he has also shown the apparently enormous influence of its most articulate advocates.
For all these reasons I am hard put to agree that Professor
Hurst has banished laissez faire from the nineteenth century though I quite agree that he has shown that the law was used,
and frequently used, throughout the period. Rather than dismissing it as an idle figment of "self-conscious philosophizing," however, I should say that he has given us every reason to analyze
the term more carefully in its nineteenth century context. For
he has not only shown the importance of law in the period; he
has also shown (though he does not, and possibly will not, admit
it) that "laissez faire" as used by nineteenth century writers did
not preclude the coexistence of that law.
It may seem that my criticism of this book is unfair and irrelevant. After all, I have conceded that Professor Hurst has
accomplished all that he set out to do: to show that the law was
used positively in the nineteenth century. If, however, he claimed
to have proved no more than that I should have cheerfully congratulated him on a job well done. But he claims more. Regarding "laissez faire" as simply a myth "propagated" by "political
debate of the last sixty years" (p. 7), he claims to have cleared
the past of this misconception; and in its place he substitutes
something that sounds suspiciously like twentieth century legal
pragmatism: a nineteenth century that was "prepared to treat
the law as an instrument to be used wherever it looked as if it
would be useful." (p. 10)
But what would ante-bellum writers like Jefferson and John
Taylor of Caroline and Thomas Cooper and Nathaniel Beverley
Tucker and John McVickar and Thoreau and Channing and
Emerson and Kent and Story- all of whom advocated, at one
time or another, something they thought was laissez faire-what
would they think of the notion that "laissez faire" had been
foisted on them by political debate of subsequent generations?
Must we assume that these writers were mere "self conscious
philosophers" who had no influence on the "workaday people"
of their day? Were the "workaday people" really so free of the
then oft-expressed fears of governmental despotism and corruption as to regard the law dispassionately "as if it were an instrumentto be used wherever it looked as if it would be useful"
(p. 10) ? Does it, in short, follow that because the law was used
as Professor Hurst has described, :that legal pragmatism, rather
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than laissez faire, was the "decisive faith or belief of our
nineteenth century ancestors"? (p. 5) ?
The unfortunate implication of this book is that, since the
law was used in certain instances, laissez faire and everything
consistent with it was nonsense. This is, of course, not true, as Professor Hurst would, I am sure, readily agree. For he is
fully aware of the fact that his book is based on only one aspect
of nineteenth century law- that is, the ways in which it was
used. And he knows that other equally important aspects - as
for example the actual reasons and justifications for so using the
law -are
deliberately excluded. Thus we cannot quarrel with
him for limiting the scope of his study; but we may object to
the implication that the excluded aspects are unnecessary. The
whole can never be understood solely in terms of one part; and
until all the parts-including the "self conscious philosophizing"
- are analyzed, and synthesized, conclusions are premature.
And this is, I submit, the case with Professor Hurst's conclusions as regards laissez faire.
Laissez faire was an ideal that cannot be exploded or dismissed simply by proving that courts sat and legislatures passed
statutes. It was a vital force in nineteenth century life and to
consider it an outdated and exploded myth is to misrepresent
the age and to distort its history. 7 And I can but hope that Prointerference should be the leading principle of their policy, and interference the
exception only." Id. at 308.
Another illustration of the similarity between the ideals of the Classical Political Economists and Professor Hurst's "working principles" is found in Mill's
essay entitled "Of the Influence of Production on Consumption": "The legislature
[he wrote] has to look solely to tw6 points: that no obstacle shall exist to prevent
those who have the means of producing, from employing those means as they find
most for their interest; and that those who have not at present the means of producing, to the extent that they may desire to consume, shall have every facility
afforded to their acquiring the means, that, becoming producers, they may be
enabled to consume."

ESSAYS ON

SOME UNSETTLED

QUESTIONS

OF POLITICAL

ECONOMY 49-50 (1844).
And lest one think the classical political economists were abstract and unpractical "self-conscious philosophers," see Cannan's masterful destruction of this delusion in A HISTORY OF THE THEORIES OF PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION IN ENGLISH POLITICAL ECONOMY FROM 1776-1848, at 385-92 (3d ed. 1929).
17. Proof that laissez faire was a vital force as an ideal in pre-Civil War America seems to me to be found in developments after 1870. Professor Hurst concedes
that this latter period was "our most influential generation of laissez faire, if we
ever had one." (p. 82) But he attributes it to "policy made by drift and default."
(p. 75) I should think, on the contrary, that it was the direct consequence of the
"self-conscious philosophizing" of the earlier period. As Professor Louis Hartz put
it (in his attack on laissez faire in Pennsylvania) : "Concept for concept, in a
remarkable way, the ideas fashioned by the anti-State theorists towards the close
of our period (1776-1860) found historical fulfillment in the subsequent age."
ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA 1776-1860, at 320
(1948).
Laissez faire is, in one sense, a myth. If, that is, we accept
the definition
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fessor Hurst will, in his forthcoming volumes on "the history of
the interplay of law and other institutions in the growth of the
United States" (of which this book is but a "progress" report,
p. vii), include also the "interplay" of the "self-conscious philosophizing" of the people themselves. If he does he will, I am
sure, be more anxious to understand what laissez faire meant to
nineteenth century people than he will be to exorcise it from our
past.
Calvin Woodard*
by Currin Shields.
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1958. Pp. x,
310. $5.00.

DEMOCRACY AND CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA,

Mr. Shields, who supplements his academic life as a teacher
of political theory with lively practical interest in political activities at the local, state, and national levels, has written a volume for popular reading- for, as he puts it, people like the
members of the "Westside Civic Improvement League." His
style is both forceful and lucid and progresses gradually from
patient exposition to impatient argument.
His thesis, however, does not correspond exactly to the title
given it. Although it does concern the compatibility of "Democratic" theory and Catholic thought, and is addressed to American readers, it is not essentially, but only incidentally, about
Democracy in America and Catholicism in America. Besides,
Mr. Shields is as much concerned with opposing and condemning
"Liberalism" as he is with his announced subjects. Democracy,
Liberalism, and Catholic Political Thought, for example, would
have been a more accurate title.
The chapters in which Mr. Shields gives expositions of
"Liberal" political thought (in the original seventeenth and
eighteenth century connotation), "Democratic" theory and practice (as he would have it), and Catholic thought on the form
and substance of political and social institutions are extremely
well and extremely honestly done. All fair-minded people will
welcome this non-Catholic's unbiased and uncolored informative
Professor Richard Hofstadter has given it (in another context) : "By 'myth', as I
use the word here, [he writes] I do not mean an idea that is simply false, but
rather one that so effectively embodies men's values that it profoundly influences
their way of perceiving reality and hence their behaviour. In this sense, myths may
have varying degrees of fiction or reality." THE AGE OF R.FORm 24n (1956).
*A.B., University of North Carolina; LL.B., Yale Law School, Member, New
York Bar; Research Student, Peterhouse College, Cambridge, England.

